INTRODUCTION
The cornerstone of the regulatory system for capital markets in the United
Kingdom is the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK) c 8 ('FSMA 2000').
The Act is envisaged as a framework for regulation and therefore its focus is on regulatory procedures such as rule-making and enforcement rather than substantive rules, which are to be found largely in the rulebook of the regulator, the Financial Services Authority ('FSA'). 1 The regulatory objectives of the FSMA 2000 are:
(a) Market confidence
The market confidence objective is maintaining confidence in the financial system.
The financial system includes financial markets and exchanges, regulated activities and other activities connected with financial markets and exchanges. Market confidence does not imply a policy of preventing all failures but involves minimising the impact of failures and providing mechanisms to protect consumers of financial services (in the broad sense).
(b) Public awareness
The public awareness objective is promoting public understanding of the financial system. This includes awareness of the benefits and risks associated with different kinds of investments and the provision of appropriate information and advice. 
(c) The protection of consumers
The consumer protection objective is securing the appropriate degree of protection for consumers. In considering what is appropriate, the FSA must have regard to risk, expertise, the need for information and advice and the general principle that consumers should take responsibility for their decisions. 'Consumer' is defined broadly and includes: (1) past, present and potential customers of authorised persons;
(2) companies and persons entering into transactions in a business capacity; and,
persons who derive rights from persons who are 'consumers'.
(d) The reduction of financial crime
The reduction of financial crime objective is to reduce the extent to which it is possible for a business carried on (1) by a regulated person or (2) in contravention of the general prohibition against carrying on regulated activity without authorisation, to be used for a purpose in connection with financial crime. Financial crime includes any offence involving fraud or dishonesty; misconduct in, or misuse of information relating to, a financial market; or handling the proceeds of crime. The FSMA 2000
itself establishes offences falling within the scope of this objective, such as making misleading statements and engaging in market manipulation. 4 The FSMA 2000 also refers to principles of good regulation to which the FSA must have regard in carrying out its duties. 5 They are:
(a) the need to use its resources in the most efficient and economic way;
(b) the responsibilities of those who manage the affairs of authorised persons;
(c) the principle that a burden or restriction which is imposed on a person, or on the carrying on of an activity, should be proportionate to the benefits, considered in general terms, which are expected to result from the imposition of that burden or restriction;
(d) the desirability of facilitating innovation in connection with regulated activities;
(e) the international character of financial services and markets and the desirability of maintaining the competitive position of the United Kingdom;
(f) the need to minimise the adverse effects on competition that may arise from anything done in the discharge of those functions;
(g) the desirability of facilitating competition between those who are subject to any form of regulation by the Authority.
The FSMA 2000 should not, however, be viewed as a comprehensive system of regulation for capital markets, because it operates alongside other legal regimes which make an important contribution. From the perspective of listed entities, company law is of particular significance because it sets out the basic regulatory obligations applicable to all companies. For example, disclosure and statutory accounting obligations apply to most companies in one form or another. From the perspective of market participants (such as brokers, investment banks and fund managers), the FSMA 2000 regulatory system operates in tandem with contractual and fiduciary obligations owed to customers in specific circumstances: these regulatory and private law obligations often appear quite similar but they are rarely coextensive.
The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers is also a significant feature of the United Kingdom regulatory regime, reflecting the importance of takeovers as part of the corporate governance system in the UK. Viewed in its entirety, the regulatory system for capital markets in the United Kingdom is therefore much more than FSMA 2000:
it is in reality a combination of legal sources which operate in different ways and pursue different objectives.
The regulatory objectives of FSMA 2000 do not provide a clear roadmap towards an enforcement strategy, but they do provide an initial indication that enforcement is unlikely to be a mechanistic response to every contravention. That initial impression is borne out by the manner in which enforcement policy and practice has developed within the FSMA 2000 regulatory regime and associated legal regimes. As discussed below, several features of the United Kingdom's regulatory system result in formal enforcement action being quite rare. That outcome is capable of many different interpretations. 6 In order to set it in context, I begin by first looking at the development of FSMA 2000 regulation and then the role of self-regulatory rules and market discipline in the United Kingdom model. I then move on to examine the link between models of responsibility and enforcement. I conclude by examining the modes of enforcement and sanctions that are available within the FSMA 2000 system.
I RISK-BASED REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT
A risk-based approach to regulation is now firmly embedded in the regulatory system established under FSMA 2000. That outcome is the result of a deliberate policy choice made by the FSA, as there is nothing in the statutory framework that explicitly or implicitly requires the FSA to adopt such an approach. 7 It does, however, reflect a broader move in regulatory systems towards a risk-based approach. 8 The meaning of risk-based regulation within the FSMA 2000 context is made clear by the following explanation given by the FSA Chairman:
The theory of risk management at the FSA is very close to that of risk management in a financial firm, in that there are the same elements of setting aims (in our case attaining our statutory objectives rather than a financial objective), establishing our risk appetite, identifying risks to our statutory objectives, establishing an agreed measure of risk, monitoring those risks, and managing them through both those with direct responsibility and those who provide challenge. At a reasonably high level of generality, the process of risk management in the FSA and in a financial firm are the same. And at a very high level of abstraction, they are the same: a cycle of risk identification, measurement, mitigation, control and monitoring.
9
As regards enforcement, risk-based regulation has two important implications.
First, not all contraventions are necessarily the subject of enforcement action. Second, specific priority areas may be targeted for action because of the implications they carry in terms of risk to the FSA's statutory objectives. 10 The corollary, of course, is that there will be some contraventions that are ignored or fall below the regulatory radar because they occur in relatively low risk areas. Furthermore, there may well be instances in which an individual or firm is the subject of enforcement action when the relevant conduct is tolerated on the part of others. In that sense, there may be a sense of injustice on the part of an entity selected for enforcement action, where the purpose of that action is primarily to change the behaviour of others who are likely to have engaged in the same course of conduct. The net result is that risk-based regulation envisages from the outset that enforcement will not be an automatic response to a contravention. In the FSA's own words: 'The risk-based approach is as valid for enforcement as for the FSA's other activities. One practical consequence of this is that the FSA cannot, and does not, attempt to pursue every rule breach.' 11 Statistics on enforcement tend to reinforce this view. There have been only 49 occasions 12 on which a financial penalty has been imposed on a firm since N2, 13 and in more than half of those cases the firm was designated as 'high risk' within the FSA's risk classification system for authorised firms. 14 However, any interpretation of the low incidence of enforcement action in the UK must take into account that enforcement action is only one of the regulatory tools available to the FSA to deal with contraventions. Alternatives, which are regarded by the FSA as contributing to compliance, include supervisory action, theme work and the policy consultation process. It follows that there can be no simple conclusions drawn between the low incidence of enforcement action and levels of compliance, because compliance is a function of several different factors and it is difficult to separate the causal effect of each.
II PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT

A
The Move towards More-Principles-Based Regulation
The FSA is committed to developing principles-based regulation. 15 The rationale is that 'this can produce better outcomes for both consumers and financial services industry by encouraging a keen focus on how best to act in a particular situation rather than simply following a more mechanistic approach.' 16 The emphasis 7 on outcomes in principle-based regulation rather than inputs or processes has been stressed by the FSA, and so too has the flexibility offered by principles-based regulation to firms in responding to regulation in terms of the structure and conduct of their business.
17
Underlying this policy are two assumptions. The first is that principles-based regulation can be readily identified and differentiated from 'rule-based' regulation.
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On its website, the FSA poses the following question: 'What does the FSA mean by "principles-based regulation" rather than "rules"?' It provides the following answer:
Our approach is underpinned by the principle that it is neither possible nor desirable to write a rule to cover every specific situation or need for decision that a regulated firm might encounter. Instead, we focus on the Principles set out in the FSMA. These set out in more general terms the types of behaviour that we expect of firms and individuals (for example -'A firm must conduct its business with due skill, care and diligence').
19
At one level, the structure of the FSA Handbook makes the principle-rule distinction quite straight-forward. It comprises high-level principles and detailed rules, which are often linked directly with the principles and expressed as giving more precise content to the generality of the principle. Such an approach is also evident in other aspects of underneath principles, because that exercise does not in itself contribute to an understanding of the relationship between the principles and the rules. The critical features are (a) the extent to which the principles can, in isolation, form the basis for compliance and enforcement and (b) alternatively, the extent to which principles can override specific rules that flow from the principle. Thus, while it may be possible to identify regulatory systems that adopt some elements of a principles-based approach, 21 it is only when these two characteristics are present that a system can be regarded as being based on, rather than just influenced by, a principles-based approach. That is an issue I return to in Section B below.
The second assumption underlying the FSA policy is that principles-based regulation is superior as a regulatory technique to rule-based regulation. That is a common assertion 22 in the post-Enron and WorldCom environment, but not one that is always supported by evidence or reasoned argument. 23 The FSA's arguments in favour of the superiority assertion are that:
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• detailed prescriptive standards have not in the past prevented misconduct;
• the current volume and complexity of FSA standards acts as both a barrier to entry and a barrier to compliance;
• prescriptive rules divert attention towards compliance with the letter rather than the spirit of the standard; • many issues are not dealt with adequately by prescriptive standards, or can be dealt with in that way only at the cost of making the system overly complex;
• prescriptive standards are costly for FSA and consumer resources.
These arguments are certainly persuasive to some degree but they also reflect implicit judgments in respect of the causal influences that contribute to the success or failure of the regulatory system. There have been few attempts to subject the superiority assertion to widespread scrutiny or testing, but this process has occurred to some extent in the field of accounting standards, where the principles-versus-rules debate has a longer lineage. 25 In that context, recent versions of the superiority assertion have been premised on the basis that a rule-based system of accounting standards in the United States contributed to the collapse of Enron in a manner that would not have occurred had the (supposedly) more principles-based accounting standards in the UK applied. 26 However, it has been argued that it is simply wrong 27 to characterise accounting standards in the United States as more rule and less principle-based than those in the UK, and that a better explanation is that Enron was indicative of a failure to apply auditing principles in a manner which recognised the qualitative nature of accounting and instead applied rules in a mechanistic manner. 28 A variant on that argument is that the US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles do not lack a foundation of principles, but rather that auditors are unable or unwilling, because of the influence exerted over them by their clients, to interpret principles according to 25 regulates matters such as board structure and composition in a manner that had not occurred before its introduction.
B The Implications of More Principles-Based Regulation for Enforcement
As suggested earlier, there are (at least) two tests for identifying a principlesbased regulatory system. The first is whether the principles can stand on their own for the purposes of compliance and enforcement. 34 The second, relevant in particular when there may be the possibility that compliance with detailed rules in a particular instance will result in a departure from a principle, is whether principles are capable of overriding rules. 35 In both instances it seems clear that if the test is met the system can correctly be described as principles-based. These tests distinguish a true principles-based system of regulation from those in which principles may be present to some degree but do not meet the two tests.
36
Closely linked with the issue of whether a particular principle has the capacity to be enforced independently, is the issue of predictability. This focuses on whether a principle has sufficient content to guide the regulated to compliant solutions and to provide a sufficiently clear basis for the regulator to be able to take enforcement 34 For this purpose the potential complication of distinguishing clearly between principles and rules is ignored. Even within a regulatory system such as FSMA 2000, which distinguishes explicitly between principles and rules, the matter may become confused. The FSA, when referring to enforcement, has sometimes described principles as rules: . 38 The latter point in particular has not been lost on the FSA, which has frequently referred to the need for its principles to satisfy the requirement of predictability: see, eg, Whittaker, above n 24. 39 The Securities and Futures Authority had regulated investment firms prior to the creation of the FSA. with book-building and price stabilisation exercises. The significance of these cases is that enforcement action was not possible under the market abuse regime because the relevant conduct fell outside the scope of the regime in each instance: it was only through independent enforcement of principles that the FSA was able to take action.
A similar approach to the independent enforcement of principles can be found in the retail financial sector.
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The most important implication of the independent enforceability of FSA principles is that firms and individuals cannot rely on compliance with detailed rules as an adequate compliance strategy. In that sense firms and individuals bear the risks associated with the application of principles to new developments or unforeseen circumstances, 47 with the proviso that the principle provides a sufficient degree of predictability regarding the range of appropriate responses. How extensive that risk will become as principles-based regulation expands depends to a considerable extent on (a) the reaction of the courts 48 to the challenges that are likely to be made in instances in which principles are argued not to have the required degree of predictability, and (b) the extent to which the FSA 'fleshes out' principles through rules and guidance. Rather ominously, the FSA, in observing that enforcement of principles may require a different approach to the enforcement of rules, has pointed to 44 57 Assuming of course that the market cannot independently discover non-compliance as it occurs. It seems likely that the market will discover covert non-compliance over time, not least because reports from organisations such as the PIRC are prepared specifically to inform institutional investors. 58 This is likely to occur as a result of monitoring by or on behalf of institutional investors: see, eg, the PIRC surveys.
views of compliance as between companies and outsiders is to delay, rather than to prevent, a finding of non-compliance.
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Non-compliance with the 'comply or explain' obligation contained in the Code should in principle trigger two responses. The first is that investors should demand that an adequate explanation be given. There is little evidence in the public domain that this does in fact occur. 60 However, there are two complicating factors.
One is that there is some evidence to suggest that a company which is able to sustain relative outperformance in its share price will not be asked to provide a 'comply or explain' reason for its departure from the Combined Code. 61 A possible rationalisation of this outcome is that the board of such a company has demonstrated superior management skills and should therefore be permitted greater leeway in setting the organisational and operational framework. 62 Another is that investors may prefer to exert influence in private rather than public on the basis that public disagreements are likely to be damaging to reputation and the share price. The second response that might be triggered by contravention of the 'comply or explain' principle is enforcement action by the FSA or FRC. 63 To date, no such action has been initiated, indicating that attention has focused on the formal aspect of the 'explain' obligation in instances of non-compliance rather than on whether a proper explanation has been
given. An additional complication in this field is that the FSA's focus on market 59 This can also be evidenced in the PIRC, above n 55, where the compliance rate is increasing year-byyear. 60 any system, but the attempt in the UK to integrate it into the regulatory structure makes the regulatory and enforcement mix particularly difficult to read. On one reading, the absence of major failures in recent years and the relative success of the UK as a location for listing and capital markets transactions might suggest that the mix works well. On another reading, self-regulation might be seen as little more than the selective protection of mutual self-interest by institutional investors, with the contribution to regulation in the public interest being quite limited.
IV CORPORATE, COLLECTIVE OR INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY?
The United Kingdom regulatory system, viewed broadly so as to include company law, adopts three different models of responsibility for acts or omissions of a corporate entity. 73 In some instances it is the corporate entity itself that bears responsibility. This model forms the basis of many of the FSMA 2000-based obligations, which are expressed as binding on an authorised firm or a listed entity. It also operates in company law to make a company responsible for acts or omissions that it has authorised. In others instances, it is the board of directors as a collective entity that bears responsibility. The Combined Code reinforces that view, its first main principle being that: 'Every company should be headed by an effective board, which is collectively responsible for the success of the company'. That reference to collective responsibility is made with the framework of the concept of accountability adopted by the Combined Code, which focuses on the accountability of the board to the shareholders. In that sense, collective responsibility operates internally within the 73 For a general discussion of models of responsibility, see Mark Bovens, The Quest for Responsibility: Accountability and Citizenship in Complex Organisations (1998). In addition to the three models identified here, Bovens proposes a fourth, termed 'hierarchical', in which responsibility is located by reference to position within a hierarchy. While the regulatory obligations imposed on senior managers in FSA authorised firms are related to position within the firm's hierarchy, it is argued below that the requirement for personal culpability results in the responsibility of senior managers being closer to the 'individual' rather than the 'hierarchical' model of responsibility. The broad framework is therefore one in which, depending on the characterisation of a particular act or omission, enforcement might be targeted against the corporate entity, the board collectively, or individuals. Characterisation of the regulatory nature of particular acts or omissions is significant because they cannot always be allocated exclusively to a particular regime. For example, a single act may well involve a breach of the Combined Code, FSA regulatory rules, and a director's duty of care and skill. Moreover, a single lapse might even involve conduct that appeared to comply with one particular regulatory regime but to contravene another. 74 Thus, characterisation of the lapse will affect who takes enforcement against whom and on what basis.
Within the narrower framework of the FSMA 2000 regulatory system, the focus of enforcement is simpler because the FSMA 2000 regulatory system does not 74 This possibility has been recognised as being quite real: see Gray and Hamilton, above n 7, 154-6, for the discussion of scenarios in which it might occur. The main source of conflict is that corporate law regards the duties of directors as owed to each individual company within a group, whereas the FSMA 2000 regulatory rules for senior management -Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls ('SYSC') -require senior managers to manage the group as a whole.
itself recognise the concept of the collective responsibility of the board. The possibility of enforcement against an individual under SYSC or APER does not, however, mean that it will occur as a matter of course, even if the contravention falls within areas prioritised by the risk-based approach to regulation as a specific statutory provision requires the FSA to consider whether it is appropriate to 83 Approval is subject to the FSA being satisfied that the relevant person is 'fit and proper' to perform the relevant controlled function. 84 FSMA 2000. The relevant sanctions include: withdrawal of 'approved person' status (s 63); a financial penalty (s 66); or a public statement of misconduct (s 66). A prohibition order (under s 56) preventing an individual from engaging in specified regulated activities is a broader sanction that is not limited to the approved persons regime and is regarded by the FSA as a more serious penalty than withdrawal of approval. 85 Gray and Hamilton, above n 7, 75. 86 See FSMA 2000 s 66; see also the enforcement action against Deutsche Bank/David Maslen, above n 44.
take action against individuals. 87 This approach recognises that it may not always be appropriate to take action against individuals, and is reflected in statements made by the FSA stressing that personal culpability is an essential element of a decision to take enforcement action against an individual. 88 It is this feature that distinguishes the model of individual responsibility adopted by the FSA from a purely hierarchical model of responsibility -in which position within the hierarchy, without a requirement for personal culpability, is the basis on which responsibility is allocated. 89 The low level of enforcement action against individuals under SYSC or APER tends to bear out the impression that this statutory consideration limits enforcement action. 90 On the other hand, recent enforcement action under APER against a senior manager knowingly concerned in a breach of Principle 5 91 by
Deutsche Bank 92 indicates that independent enforcement of principles applies as much to individuals as to firms. 93 In that sense, individuals also bear responsibility for interpreting and implementing principles. . 89 See Bovens, above n 73, ch 6, arguing that this feature of the hierarchical model violates one of the basic requirements of accountability (viz blameworthiness), resulting in such systems being fundamentally flawed. 90 Gray and Hamilton, above n 7, conclude from a survey of action taken against individuals under the approved persons regime that 'as with the use of the prohibition order power, the use of this sanction has been confined to instances where the misconduct in question is flavoured with a lack of integrity'. 91 95 Applicable to the Official List, a term still used in the UK to identify the segment of traded securities that are subject to the 'super-equivalent' regime, under which the UK has gone beyond the requirements imposed by the relevant EC Directives.
rules relating to prospectuses. However, the very low incidence of (public) That trend is not immediately obvious from the relatively low incidence of enforcement action against individuals but, as indicated at the outset, the incidence of enforcement action is a particularly difficult variable to interpret. It is quite likely that 96 These are rules applicable to securities admitted to trading on all regulated markets (even if they are not on the Official List): examples are the London International Financial Futures Exchange, the Professional Securities Market, and the Virt-x Exchange Ltd. The Alternative Investment Market, which has recently attracted many listings of overseas companies, made a policy choice in 2004 not to be a regulated market so as to leave itself the freedom to set its own disclosure rules. 97 Gray and Hamilton, above n 7, 179. 98 See FSA Handbook GEN 6.1, ENF 13.1.3G. 99 See Companies Act 1985 ss 309A, 309B. which is an independent private sector body funded by the accountancy profession, the DTI, and City institutions. 105 The FRRP reviews Reports produced by issuers of listed securities for compliance with the accounting requirements of the listing rules. 106 It cooperates with the FSA in carrying out this function and adopts a risk-based approach to the selection of Reports for scrutiny. 107 Three outcomes are possible following identification of deficiencies in accounts. The first and most common is that the FRRP agrees a correction to accounts with the relevant issuer. The second is that the FRRP can make an application to the court to require an issuer to revise defective accounts. 108 The third is that the FRRP can refer the matter to the FSA, which can impose the following penalties for breach of the listing regime: public censure; a financial penalty to be paid by the issuer and/or possibly also its senior management; 109 discontinue or suspend listing.
B Private Enforcement
Private enforcement is not a major feature of the system of capital markets has a relatively sophisticated set of sanctions available to it. However, the risk-based approach to regulation (above) is one factor which results in resort to formal sanctions being quite rare. Another factor is the emphasis placed by the FSA on the settlement of enforcement proceedings. 121 The rationale for settlement is that it 'results in consumers obtaining compensation earlier than would otherwise be the case, the saving of FSA and industry resources, in messages getting out to the market sooner and assists in a public perception of timely and effective action'.
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Another issue that has an impact on sanctions and settlement is the procedural fairness of the FSA disciplinary procedure. This issue proved contentious during parliamentary debate on the FSMA Bill in the late 1990s and has continued to drive changes in FSA practice up to the present day.
Each of these issues is now considered in more detail. A
Sanctions: The Statutory Options
The range of sanctions available to the FSA is as follows:
(i) Public censure. This sanction is intended to cause a change in the behaviour of its recipient and act as a deterrent to others through the potential damage to reputation that may follow from publication of a contravention.
(ii) Unlimited financial penalties. There are a number of provisions in FSMA 2000 that permit the FSA to impose an unlimited financial penalty for contravention. 123 While no limits are set for the penalty, the FSA is required to publish guidance as to its practice in setting penalties. 124 The FSA holds the distinction of having imposed both the single largest 
B
Settlements: Process and Incentives
Settlements for the purpose of FSA enforcement are regulatory decisions taken by the FSA, the terms of which the firm or individual concerned accepts.
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Unlike settlements in commercial out-of-court cases, they are made public through the publicity requirements attached to FSA decision-making. 136 
C
Procedural Complications
Since its inception, the FSMA 2000 disciplinary regime has raised issues of procedural fairness. 139 The FSMA Bill was amended during its passage through Parliament to reflect this concern and to shield the FSA and government from challenges based on the incompatibility of the disciplinary process with the European Convention on Human Rights. 140 In particular, legal aid was made available to individuals subject to disciplinary procedures, an appeal system was put in place, and the use of compelled evidence (which has been instrumental in providing evidence in 137 See FSA Handbook ENF 13. Formal enforcement action is a relatively rare occurrence in the regulatory system in the UK. It is limited primarily by the regulatory and enforcement policy adopted by the FSA. Risk-based regulation means that enforcement policy does not target or pursue all contraventions. The recent move to more principles-based regulation does not carry direct implications for the incidence or pattern of enforcement action, but it does carry implications for enforceability. In particular, it raises the possibility of challenges to independent enforcement of principles which lack an adequate degree of foreseeability. However, to the extent that enforcement based on principles rather than rules is already quite well established, the process is one of expansion rather than innovation and therefore the risks are correspondingly lower.
The reliance on self-regulation and market discipline in the United Kingdom compliance. This would imply that the other regulatory activities in which the FSA engages have a lower compliance value than enforcement action, yet there is no clear evidence of that being the case. Equally, it would be wrong to conclude that a higher level of enforcement activity in the US implies a lower level of compliance: it may simply be the result of a higher ratio of enforcement action to contraventions.
Differences in the regulatory structure and enforcement patterns as between different
